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Abstract When ethical decisions have to be taken in
critical, complex medical situations, they often involve
decisions that set the course for or against life-sustaining
treatments. Therefore the decisions have far-reaching
consequences for the patients, their relatives, and often for
the clinical staff. Although the rich psychology literature
provides evidence that reasoning may be affected by
undesired influences that may undermine the quality of the
decision outcome, not much attention has been given to
this phenomenon in health care or ethics consultation. In
this paper, we aim to contribute to the sensitization of the
problem of systematic reasoning biases by showing how
exemplary individual and group biases can affect the
quality of decision-making on an individual and group
level. We are addressing clinical ethicists as well as cli-
nicians who guide complex decision-making processes of
ethical significance. Knowledge regarding exemplary
group psychological biases (e.g. conformity bias), and
individual biases (e.g. stereotypes), will be taken from the
disciplines of social psychology and cognitive decision
science and considered in the field of ethical decision-
making. Finally we discuss the influence of intuitive versus
analytical (systematical) reasoning on the validity of
ethical decision-making.
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Introduction: reflecting on the origins of misjudgment
The susceptibility to undesirable influences in medical
decision-making—and the ensuing misjudgment or error—
has been studied more thoroughly with regard to patients
than with regard to health care professionals. One para-
mount example regarding treatment is the Placebo Effect
and its consequences (Beecher 1955; Brody 1997). In
human experimentation, the Rosenthal Effect, also called
‘experimenter expectancy effect’, that holds that the sub-
ject’s responses can be influenced through the study lea-
der’s expectations, has been acknowledged as an influential
factor (Rosenthal 1966). Is there a need for health care
professionals to also reflect on their own susceptibility,
especially in ethically sensitive situations? We argue that
there is evidence for such a need, will show why this is the
case, and suggest what should be taken into consideration.
The ethical significance of making treatment decisions,
especially in severely ill and vulnerable patients, has
received increasing acknowledgement among health care
professionals. This awareness can be seen as one factor that
has paved the way for the development of clinical ethics
support services in the last two decades (American Society
for Bioethics and Humanities, ASBH 1998). Research in
medical ethics may include, according to Sugarman and
Sulmasy (2001), decision analysis as a field of academic
inquiry (Asch 2001). Analyzing treatment decisions and
their inherent risk of bias, misjudgment, or fallacy, may
benefit from research conducted in psychology on imper-
fect reasoning and the risk of making errors. The discourse
on the methodology of ethics or meta-ethics has so far
primarily focused on the challenge of avoiding the is—
ought fallacy (Hume 1978; Moore 1959). Sugarman and
Sulmasy (2001) list however several other types of fallacy,
such as concluding moral validity from majority votes, or
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the derivation of moral judgment from historical facts.
Taking quality improvement seriously, we ought to try to
improve decision-making and clinical ethics support by
understanding and avoiding psychological influences that
diminish our capacity for appropriate reasoning.
Psychology research has been instrumental in high-
lighting specific errors, fallacies and mistakes. It also sheds
light on the characteristics of situations and persons or
groups that may trigger bias in making judgments and
decisions. One of the most prominent discoveries has been
the Halo Effect that holds that aspects of the general
impression of a person (such as attractiveness), dominates
judgment on details such as the person’s intellectual
capacity (Thorndike 1920). Moral reasoning and judgment
has been the subject of sophisticated psychological inves-
tigation for two decades; the research of Lawrence Kohl-
berg, Carol Gilligan and others have stimulated the ethics
discourse and contributed to sharpening our view on well
argued and balanced moral deliberation (Kohlberg et al.
1983; Nunner-Winkler 1984). The work of John Rawls
(1971) and other moral philosophers, especially in dis-
course ethics (Habermas 1995), have brought a move
towards models of reflection and communication that can
help to identify and overcome problematic forms of rea-
soning and conversation.
In clinical ethics support services, the topic of errors and
mistakes has been addressed in a textbook edited by Rubin
and Zoloth (2000). The quality of ethics consultations and
their challenges are discussed and illustrated by case
studies (Rubin and Zoloth 2000; Bernal 2000; Reitemeier
2000; Fletcher et al. 2000). Nevertheless, more research is
necessary to find out how we can systematically clean our
decisions and consultations from reasoning errors that may
go unnoticed. Especially studies that evaluate clinical
ethics consultation should address the issue of the preva-
lence of bias, misjudgment or fallacy on the quality of
reasoning and decision-making (Foerde et al. 2008;
Pfaefflin et al. 2009). Also clinical situations that are
characterized by complexity and uniqueness require par-
ticular sensitivity and competence regarding ethical issues;
they carry a risk of stimulating inappropriate reasoning and
communication due to ‘natural’ dispositions that may be
disclosed by applying the findings of psychological
research.
Explicit clinical ethical decision-making in critical and
complex medical situations often involves decisions
regarding continuing or ceasing a life-sustaining treatment.
Such decisions have far-reaching consequences for patients
and their relatives as well as for the clinical staff. Therefore
the quality of the decision is particularly important. In order
to assure quality, such decisions are usually discussed as
part of an inter-professional, clinical ethics case discussion,
moral case deliberation, or clinical ethics consultation
(Molewijk et al. 2008; Reiter-Theil 2009). Both experience
and practice reports show that decision processes may be
affected or biased both on the team level as well as on the
individual level (e.g. Rubin and Zoloth 2000). This paper
aims at making a contribution to the field of clinical deci-
sion-making and ethics support services in order to better
understand and avoid these processes, and to formulate
recommendations for good practice. We argue on the basis
of a comprehensive understanding of clinical ethics support
including more informal rounds; routine rounds where an
ethical issue arises; as well as a full ethics consultation that
has been requested to solve a specific problem. By
addressing clinical ethicists as well as clinicians who are
leading or participating in ethics case discussions, we want
to sensitize the reader to these issues, and suggest a way to
control systematic biases in decision-making.
Our work relies on interdisciplinary competencies
including clinical ethics consultation, quality improvement,
psychology, and nursing. In the first section, relevant
selected findings on systematic decision biases from the
descriptive socio-psychological approach and the cognitive
decision science will be discussed. The focus will be on
examples of systematic inadequacy with group and indi-
vidual decisions, and their application to clinical ethical
decision situations. The second section discusses intuitive
versus analytical decision strategies, and their influence on
the clinical ethical decision-making process.
Systematic reasoning errors
The need for ethical reflection in decision-making usually
arises in complex situations, typically involves a large
amount of diverse, interconnected types of information,
and will have to cope with missing data as well as ambi-
guities. The decision-making situation may be dynamic and
nontransparent, and be dependent on changes in the
patient’s condition, uncertain prognosis, and undesired or
uncontrollable effects. Such decisions sometimes need to
be made under time pressure, with some of the conse-
quences being irreversible.
Psychological research has shown that in such complex,
interconnected, dynamic decision situations, our brain is
susceptible to ‘reasoning errors’ (e.g. Do¨rner 1997;
Jungermann et al. 2005, p. 281). Systematic, i.e. non-
accidental reasoning errors (Redelmeier et al. 2001), hap-
pen repeatedly with most people. However identifying and
controlling reasoning biases in ethical decision-making
process is rarely named as a step in models of ethical
decision-making. Clinical ethical decision-making takes
place at the individual and at the group level. Therefore the
exemplary biases dealt with below (that have been taken
from the disciplines of social psychology and cognitive
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decision science), will take examples from both the indi-
vidual and group level. The following considers the role of
the selected biases within ethical decision-making pro-
cesses at the individual and at the group level.
Examples of systematic reasoning errors in group
decision-making processes
‘Process loss’: tendency of groups to concentrate
on what the majority of members know
The aspects of group interaction that inhibit optimal deci-
sion-making are termed ‘process loss’ in social psychol-
ogy. In any group, members share a certain amount of
information. However, there are always pieces of infor-
mation not known to everyone.
Strasser und Titus (1985) developed a research para-
digm to investigate the effects of shared and non-shared
information on group decisions. The paradigm is based on
the so-called ‘Hidden-Profile-Technique’, and the under-
lying findings of the ‘Collective Information Sampling’
(Gigone and Hastie 1993, 1996). Using the ‘Hidden-
Profile-Technique’ the individual group members are only
given access to a fragment of the total information, and
therefore the best decision option is not accessible i.e. it is
hidden. Groups tend to concentrate on information known
to the majority, so called shared information (Stasser and
Titus 1985), while ignoring specific information known
only to a minority—so called unshared information (see
also Kelly and Karau 1999). Shared information appears
within the group discussion to be more plausible and it will
be consensually validated (Parks and Cowlin 1996).
The influence of unshared information on the ethical
decision-making process is discussed in the following
sections.
Analysis and conclusion for practice
Clinical ethical questions cannot be resolved based solely
on shared, means medical knowledge. It is of fundamental
importance to also include non-shared information, as
ethical, legal and psychological aspects, as well as the
patient’s values. Knowledge from these areas often
involves unshared information. If a team fails to share
knowledge and to communicate during a case discussion
regarding, for example, the patient’s wishes, potentially
relevant information will not be considered.
The tendency of groups to ignore information that is
known only to some can be overcome by clarifying what
kinds of information are regarded as relevant, and who is
responsible for contributing a certain type of information.
We recommend that clinical teams as well as ethical case
rounds establish rules for daily routine on how to exchange
and record patient-relevant information that otherwise may
go unshared, thereby making it transparent to others.
Enough time should be allocated for ethical case discus-
sions in order to facilitate exchanging and considering
previously unshared information because information that
is not known to all members of the clinical team is likely
only to be mentioned during the course of a longer case
discussion (Larson et al. 1998; Stasser 2000).
Are group decisions always better than individual
decisions?
The question whether group decisions lead to better deci-
sion outcomes than individual decisions depends on certain
variables. One very crucial variable is the availability of
(additional) information to certain group members (Schulz-
Hardt et al. 2006). Unless members share their individual
knowledge, the quality of group decisions is not superior to
decisions taken by knowledgeable and responsible indi-
viduals (or even very small teams of two or three). This
seems to support forms of clinical ethics support services
following the ‘consultant’ or ‘liaison’ models (Reiter-Theil
2001, 2003, 2009; Richter 2007).
‘Group think’
Another reason for suboptimal group decisions is so-called
‘group think’. This term, coined by Janis (1982), is defined
as a quick and simple decision-making method which
people use when working in a very cohesive subgroup. A
‘cohesive subgroup’ means a relatively close-knit team that
frequently arises in the clinical setting, e.g. a health care
team intensely engaged in caring for a severely ill patient.
However, group think may also appear in discussions
between renowned experts. ‘Group think’ is characterized
by striving for agreement in a way that hinders group
members from evaluating differing or diverging views or
courses of action. This may result in values such as har-
mony or solidarity inappropriately guiding decision-mak-
ing. Although harmony and especially solidarity are highly
esteemed values, following them without reflection may
compromise ethical reasoning, and eventually lead to
simplistic agreement (Ross et al. 2006).
Analysis and conclusion for practice
It cannot be made clear enough that in spite of consensus-
building, good intentions, and even the application of
apparently sound reasoning, decision-making processes
influenced by unconsidered group think can result in ethi-
cally inappropriate decisions. In order to reduce the
occurrence of group think when dealing with complex
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ethical decisions, it is recommended that explicit decision
procedures or methods be used for reflection and struc-
turing (Agich 2001; Reiter-Theil 2009). Another strategy is
to assign the role of a moderator to an adequately trained
staff to help integrate various opinions into the case dis-
cussion. The moderator could and should counteract group
think, in addition to encouraging and facilitating exchange
of knowledge and different views; this will be even easier
if he or she is not part of the health care team, and therefore
less susceptible.
Group size and tendency to conform in groups
Psychological research reveals that pressure to conform in
a decision-making process increases with the size of a
group (Campbell and Fairey 1989; Gerard et al. 1968;
Rosenberg 1961; Saks 1977; Saks and Marti 1997).
Analysis and conclusion for practice
Discussions of ethically sensitive treatment decisions often
occur in an interactive situation with the aim of reaching a
well reasoned, justified consensus. Such discussion groups
varies in size and setting depending on the urgency and
complexity of the decision. Up to a number of four to five
people groups show a tendency to produce a pressure to
conform (Asch 1956). These group decisions carry a risk
for premature agreement. Premature agreement can be
counteracted by consciously integrating ‘unshared infor-
mation’ in the decision-making process. All members, but
particularly the moderator or ethics consultant, have the
responsibility to reflect, check, or even question an
emerging ‘consensus’ to avoid mere conformity. This is
particularly important in societal contexts that prioritize a
culture of consensus-building or strongly support the
willingness to agree or compromise.
Social impact theory
Social Impact Theory involves ‘informative social influ-
ence’ as well as ‘normative social influence’. ‘Informative
social influence’ is present when a person does not know
how to do or express something correctly. Consequently
the behavior of others is referred to as an important source
of information for selecting appropriate actions for oneself.
As this kind of reaction is typically prevalent in unknown,
confusing situations, or when the consequences of one’s
behavior are difficult to anticipate, the effect can be sig-
nificant when making critical treatment decisions under
conditions of uncertainty. In these situations, experts are
particularly influential, because they appear to have the
most knowledge and experiences concerning what reac-
tions are appropriate (Kelley 1955).
‘Normative social influence’ means that an individual
changes his or her own behavior to adapt to another person
or group, not however because of the others’ superiority in
judging the situation, but rather because the individual
wants to be accepted and integrated in the group; benefit
from in-group advantages, and avoid being criticized or
rejected. This happens through adapting to the social
norms, implicit and explicit rules or values and attitudes of
the group. Normative social influence can occur even
in situations where people conform despite knowing that
the action is wrong, as has been shown in prominent psy-
chological experimentation (Asch 1956; Milgram 1976,
1974).
Analysis and conclusion for practice
To give an example: in an institution of long-term care
there is a well established, implicit social norm that it is
morally acceptable to restrain a restless or confused patient
for medical reasons. Thus a hemiplegic patient’s non-par-
alyzed arm is restrained during the night in order to prevent
her from repeatedly pulling out the nasogastric feeding
tube. A new young nurse P. joins the care team; he feels
that this practice violates the patient’s integrity. P. finds
himself confronted with uncertainty: whether to speak out
and risk infringing group norms, or to follow normative
social influence?
If nurse P. decides to comply with the group norm, he
misses the chance to raise the ethical question whether or
not the restriction of the patient is justified and, if so, for
what reasons. Furthermore, the opportunity to clarify the
practice in the light of relevant ethics guidelines will also
be missed. Instead, mutual trust and an open group climate
should be created to enhance reflection and articulation of
ethical values and norms of all involved in order to prevent
inappropriate treatment decisions.
Examples of systematic biases in individual
decision-making processes
The following section describes relevant selected examples
of systematic biases in individual decision-making, which
might lead to a suboptimal or biased result.
Belief in a just world
The ‘belief in a just world’ bias is based on the dangerous
assumption that everyone gets what they deserve, and
everyone deserves what they get. Belief in a just world may
be applied to oneself or others, consciously or uncon-
sciously (Bierhoff 2006). The belief in a just world does
not necessarily hamper judgment processes, but it increases
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the risk of making bad decisions if applied without
reflection. People who believe in a just world sympathize
with the winners and devalue the losers (Lerner 1980).
Analysis and conclusion for practice
If health care professionals adopt a ‘just world’ position,
they could believe that patients ‘deserve’ their medical
problems because of their own behavior. This may trigger
an attitude that serves to rationalize and support discrimi-
nation (e.g. Hurst et al. 2007; Albisser Schleger and Reiter-
Theil 2007).
Clinical example for the ‘Belief-in-a-Just-World Bias’
An example is the case of a female, obese welfare aid
recipient with a slightly low IQ, arteriosclerosis and con-
sequential apoplexia with hemiplegia and speech disorder,
with the assumption being made that the problems are
caused by immoderate eating behaviour. The assessment of
this situation based on a ‘Belief in a Just World’ would
argue that her situation is self-inflicted and, thus,
‘‘deserved’’ as it is; accordingly, it would appear justifiable
to delay allocating her a place in a rehabilitation clinic.
However a more careful assessment of the situation would
disclose that the patient suffered from severe meningitis in
her youth, which has resulted in a binge eating disorder1 for
which she should not be blamed. Furthermore, the patient
has multiple risk factors for discrimination (e.g. multi-
morbidity, chronic illness, low socio-economic status), that
can lead to difficulties in obtaining a treatment place in a
rehabilitation clinic (Hurst et al. 2007).
Stereotypes, prejudice
Research has shown that stereotypes and prejudice repre-
sent subgroups of opinions and attitudes. Prejudices (such
as ‘old people are obstinate’), involve per definition emo-
tional components that are mistaken, premature, general-
izing and cliche´d. Prejudices are characterized by their
stability and resistance to change, even in the light of
contradicting information. Stereotypes (such as ‘old people
have bad health’), are oversimplified cognitive represen-
tations of the social environment, enabling quick process-
ing of information and orientation. Both stereotypes and
prejudices lead to information not being critically ques-
tioned, and to information that contradicts accepted notions
not being appropriately considered in the decision-making
process.
Analysis and conclusion for practice
Stereotypes and prejudices often have ethical connotations.
If they are introduced into the treatment decision-process
without reflection in the context of a complex clinical
ethical question, stereotypes and prejudices may lead to
inappropriate decisions.
Example
A young man forgets to buy bread at the shop, old persons
do not buy bread because they are senile.
Omission bias
The omission bias describes the subjective perception that
it is more risky to act than to omit (with omission meaning
non-action, prolonging the present state or avoid a deci-
sion). The tendency not to act if the action’s consequences
are uncertain seems to be due to the wide-spread feeling
that one is more culpable for the (potentially negative)
consequences of one’s actions, than for the same conse-
quences that would result from an omission (Anderson
2003).
Analysis and conclusion for practice
In medical practice, the psychological phenomenon of the
omission bias has been observed by Spranca et al. (1991),
and discussed from an ethical perspective, particularly
in situations with high uncertainty such as in intensive care
(Beck et al. 2008). According to this study, some intensive
care doctors were more likely to choose the passive way of
‘non-action’ or maintaining the present state when con-
fronted with complex or uncertain decision situations, such
as whether to limit a life-sustaining measure in a severely
ill patient. Preferring non-action means that no active
measures will be taken, or that ongoing treatment will be
continued without reflection. This tendency appears to be
further supported through the rule ‘above all, do no harm’,
which can be interpreted as prioritizing risk avoidance, and
as a result may be used to justify non-action or prolonga-
tion of the present state. Furthermore, fear of harming the
patient through taking action (e.g. legal claims), leads to a
preference for omission (Beck et al. 2008). As a result,
suffering may be prolonged by continuing treatment
(Aberegg et al. 2005; Albisser Schleger et al. 2008; Zik-
mund-Fisher et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2008).
The omission bias and the related emotions can be
counteracted if clinical experts consciously base their
decision on facts and commit to respect the patient’s
wishes as far as possible, while involving the relatives in an
appropriate way (Reiter-Theil et al. 2007).
1 Binge eating disorder is characterized by compulsive overeating in
which people consume huge amounts of food while feeling out of
control and powerless to stop.
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Intuitive versus analytical decision strategies and their
influence on the validity of making ethically sensitive
decisions
Ethically sensitive decisions are often complex, and opti-
mally require systematic reflection in the form of applying
a ‘balancing of interest process2 ‘to the various options that
are available for action. The choice of the cognitive
reasoning strategy—intuitive (automatic, non-reflected)
versus analytical (conscious, controlled)—seems to play a
role in influencing the quality validity of the ethical deci-
sion-making.
Intuitive reasoning
In everyday decision situations, information processing
within the decision-making process tends to occur in a
resource-saving way, with the resource ‘reasoning’ being
used as sparingly as possible. This typically implies using
intuitive, automatic, unconscious or fast decision strategies,
which lead to a decision relying on a few distinct, situa-
tional features, whereby the deeper reflection of the con-
sequences of the possible treatment options are explicitly
ignored. One approach for such a fast (and therefore
resource-saving) information processing is ‘heuristics’, so-
called rules of thumb that provide a quick orientation and
simple answers. Heuristics speed up the ability to decide by
simplifying the problem. In everyday decision situations,
they can usefully lead to quick as well as efficient
outcomes (e.g. Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Hertwig and
Todd 2003). However, empirical literature on the validity
of moral heuristics is scarce (Sunstein 2005), and
controversial.
We consider that intuitive reasoning can play a role in
identifying typically problematic situations. However in
ethical decision-making processes, what is usually required
is an explicit identification and evaluation of the conse-
quences of the various options for action. The decision and
recommendation regarding which option is ethically justi-
fiable and preferable should be based on an analytical
reasoning strategy.
Analytical reasoning
The analytical reasoning strategy is characterized inter alia
by a consciously controlled decision process that mini-
mizes automaticity, resulting in the emotional influence on
the decision process being fairly low. The decision speed is
slow because of the high number of details that need to be
considered. Such analytical decision strategies are charac-
terized by good predictive power, high reliability and high
probability that the decision will be based on the best
available scientific literature. Table 1 summarizes and
contrasts the features of intuitive versus analytical decision
strategies.
Analysis and conclusion for practice
Lack of time is a dominating phenomenon that most health
care professionals face in clinical practice. If time-saving,
intuitive decision strategies are applied uncritically to
complex, anomalous ethically sensitive decision situations,
there is a risk of systematic bias occurring, thus violating
ethical values and norms. Therefore in ethical decision-
making, the appropriate cognitive strategy should be
consciously selected.
Conclusions
In this paper we aim to contribute to the sensitization of
systematic reasoning biases. Whereas formal and particu-
larly informal fallacies are mostly addressed by philosophy
and logic, our contribution compliments these strands of
analysis by focusing on empirical research and decision
psychology because we consider these disciplines to be
valuable in this field of enquiry.
Possible risk factors for systematic biases include
undesired, latent influencing factors on individual or group
decision-making processes, as well as the reasoning strat-
egy (intuitive vs. analytical) underlying the decision.
Therefore, an awareness of potential reasoning errors is
needed. A critical reflection of information processing
supports the awareness of latent influencing factors on
complex clinical ethical decision-making processes from a
meta-perspective. Acknowledging one’s own error-prone-
ness is a prerequisite to the prevention of systematic rea-
soning errors.
Explicit decision-making strategies or methods includ-
ing check lists are possible approaches for the control of
systematic biases. They are not just mnemonic devices, but
precautionary measures against ‘reasoning ergonomics’
that may challenge the quality of the outcome.
The recent literature on clinical decision-making and the
ethics support reflects the need for a thorough discourse on
2 Balancing of interest’ is a method developed in the discipline of
ethics. It describes the process of practical reasoning needed for a
qualified solution to a choice or decision conflict. Such conflicts arise
because a specific decision may be beneficial for one person or group,
but detrimental for another person or group. In such cases, the
expected benefits and burdens must be weighed as carefully as
possible, while taking into account individual and collective needs in
addition to their urgency; the rights of the individual; precedence of
public welfare, and questions of justice.
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quality and errors in the field (Rubin and Zoloth 2000;
Pfaefflin et al. 2009). We suggest that systematically
integrating psychological, sociological or medical empiri-
cal knowledge will enhance the quality of all possible kinds
of making ethically sensitive decisions at the bedside.
The reasoning errors, biases or fallacies presented here
are not comprehensive; many other factors such as the
influence of emotions, one’s personal perspective, or the
number of available options, can influence medical ethics
decision-making and need to be addressed by further
research.
Acknowledgments This paper is part of the project ‘‘Between
Over-Treatment and Under-Treatment: Ethical Problems of Micro-
Allocation’’, no. 3200B0-113724/1, funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation. We are grateful for the helpful comments of
Prof. Volker Dittmann, Legal and Forensic Medicine, University of
Basel. We also thank Marcel Mertz, MA, for his helpful comments.
Piera Jones, MA, and Nicola Stingelin Giles, MBA, MAS, MAE gave
invaluable help in translating and editing the manuscript into native
English. The paper has benefited much from the discussions in the
PhD Colloquium, Dept. Medical and Health Ethics, Medical Faculty,
University Hospital Basel.
References
Aberegg, S.K., E.F. Haponik, and P.B. Terry. 2005. Omission bias
and decision making in pulmonary and critical care medicine.
Chest American College of Chest Physicians 128: 1497–1505.
Agich, G. 2001. The question of method in ethics consultation. The
American Journal of Bioethics 1(4): 31–41.
Albisser Schleger, H., and S. Reiter-Theil. 2007. ‘Age’ and ‘Costs’—
Factors in treatment decisions at the end-of life? An analysis of
informal knowledge structures of doctors and nurses. Ethik in
der Medizin 19: 103–119.
Albisser Schleger, H., H. Pargger, and S. Reiter-Theil. 2008.
‘Futility’—Overtreatment at the end of life? Reasons for missed
cessations of therapy in geriatric and critical care. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Palliativmedizin 9: 67–75.
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH). 1998. Core
competences for health care ethics consultation. Reprinted 2003
Glenview, IL, USA. In Ethics consultation. From theory to
practice, ed. M.P. Aulisio, R.M. Arnold, and S.J. Youngner,
165–209. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press.
Anderson, C.J. 2003. The psychology of doing nothing—Forms of
decision avoidance result from reason and emotion. Psycholog-
ical Bulletin 129: 9–167.
Asch, S.E. 1956. Studies of independence and conformity—A
minority of one against an unanimous majority. Psychological
Monographs 70(9): 416.
Asch, D.A. 2001. Economics and decision science. In Methods in
medical ethics, ed. J. Sugarman, and D.P. Sulmasy, 227–234.
Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.
Beck, S., A. van de Loo, and S. Reiter-Theil. 2008. A ‘little bit
illegal’? Withholding and withdrawing of mechanical ventilation
in the eyes of German intensive care physicians. Medicine,
Health Care and Philosophy 11: 7–16.
Beecher, H.K. 1955. The powerful placebo. The Journal of the
American Medicine Association 159: 1602–1606.
Bernal, E.W. 2000. Errors in ethics consultation. In Margin of error:
The ethics of mistakes in the practice of medicine, ed. S.B.
Rubin, and L. Zoloth, 255–272. Hagerstown, Maryland:
University Publishing Group.
Bierhoff, H. 2006. Sozialpsychologie—Ein Lehrbuch. Stuttgart:
W. Kohlhammer.
Brody, H. 1997. The doctor as therapeutic agent: A placebo research
agenda. In The placebo effect—An interdisciplinary exploration,
ed. E. Harrington, 77–92. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Campbell, J.D., and P.J. Fairey. 1989. Informational and normative
routes to conformity—The effect of faction size as a function on
norm extremity and attention to the stimulus. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 57: 457–468.
Croskerry, P. 2005. The theory and practice of clinical decision-
making. The Canadian Journal of Anasthesia 52(6/pp): R1–R8.
Do¨rner, D. 1997. The logic of failure: Recognizing and avoiding error
in complex situations. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Press.
Fletcher, J., R.J. Boyleand, and E.M. Spencer. 2000. Errors in
Healthcare Ethics Consultation. In Margin of error: The ethics of
mistakes in the practice of medicine, ed. S.B. Rubin, and
L. Zoloth, 343–373. Hagerstown, Maryland: University Publish-
ing Group.
Foerde, R., R. Pedersen, and V. Akre. 2008. Clinicians’ evaluation of
clinical ethics consultations in Norway: A tool for quality
Table 1 Characteristics of
intuitive versus analytical
decisions
Based on Croskerry 2005
Intuitive Analytical
Cognitive style Heuristic (rules of
thumb)
Systematic
Conscious control of the decision process Low High
Automaticity High Low
Decision speed Fast Slow
Decision reliability Low High
Errors Normal distribution Few, but
serious
Effort Low High
Predictive power Low High
Influence of emotions on decisions High Low
Number of details considered for decision-making Low High
Probability that the decision will be based on the best available
scientific literature
Low High
Avoiding bias in medical ethical decision-making 161
123
improvement. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11(1):
17–25.
Gerard, H.B., R.A. Wilhelmy, and E.S. Conolley. 1968. Conformity and
group size. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8: 79–82.
Gigerenzer, G., P.M. Todd, and The ABC Group. 1999. Simple
heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gigone, D., and R. Hastie. 1993. The common knowledge effect:
Information sharing and group judgment. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 65: 959–974.
Gigone, D., and R. Hastie. 1996. The impact of information on group
judgment: A model and computer simulation. In Understanding
group behavior: Consensual action by small groups, Vol. 1, ed.
E. Witte, and J.H. Davis, 221–251. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Habermas, J. 1995. Moral consciousness and communicative action.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hertwig, R., and P.M. Todd. 2003. More is not always better—The
benefits of cognitive limits. In Thinking—Psychological perspec-
tives on reasoning, judgment and decision making, ed. D. Hardman,
and L. Macchi, 213–231. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Hume, D. 1978. A treatise of human nature. Clarendon: Oxford
University Press.
Hurst, S.A., R. Forde, S. Reiter-Theil, A.M. Slowther, A. Perrier, R.
Pegoraro, and M. Danis. 2007. Physicians’ views on resource
availability and equity in four European health care systems.
BMC Health Services Research 7: 137.
Janis, I.L. 1982. Groupthink—Psychological studies of policy deci-
sions and fiascoe, 2nd ed. Boston: Hougthon Mifflin.
Jungermann, H., H.R. Pfister, and K. Fischer. 2005. Die Psychologie
der Entscheidung—Eine Einfu¨hrung. Heidelberg: Spektrum.
Kelley, H.H. 1955. The two functions of reference groups. In
Readings in social psychology, ed. G.E. Swanson, T.E. New-
comb, and E.L. Hartley, 410–414. New York: Henry Holt.
Kelly, J.R., and S.J. Karau. 1999. Group decision making—The
effects of initial preferences and time pressure. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin 25: 1342–1354.
Kohlberg, L., C. Levine, and A. Hewer. 1983. Moral stages: A
current formulation and a response to critics. Basel: Karger.
Larson, J.R.J., C. Christensen, T.M. Franz, and A.S. Abbott. 1998.
Diagnosing groups—The pooling, management, and impact of
shared and unshared case information in team-based medical
decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
75: 93–108.
Lerner, M.J. 1980. The belief in a just world—A fundamental
delusion. New York: Plenum.
Milgram, S. 1974. Obedience to authority–An experimental view.
New York: Harper & Row.
Milgram, S. 1976. Obedience to criminal orders—The compulsion to
do evil. In Contemporary social psychology—Representative
readings, ed. T. Blass, 175–184. Itasca: Peacock.
Molewijk, B., M. Verkerk, H. Milius, and G. Widdershoven. 2008.
Implementing moral case deliberation in a psychiatric hospital:
Process and outcome. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
11(1): 43–56.
Moore, G.E. 1959. Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Nunner-Winkler, G. 1984. Two Moralities? A Critical Discussion of
an Ethic of Care and Responsibility versus an Ethic of Rights
and Justice. In Morality, moral behavior, and moral develop-
ment, ed. W.M. Kurtines, and J.L. Gewirtz. New York: Wiley.
Parks, C.D., and R.A. Cowlin. 1996. Acceptance of uncommon
information into group discussion when that information is or is
not demonstrable. Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes 66(3): 307–315.
Pfaefflin, M., K. Kobert, and S. Reiter-Theil. 2009. Evaluating
clinical ethics consultation. Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare
Ethics 18(4): 406–419.
Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Redelmeier, D.A., L.E. Ferris, J.V. Tu, J.E. Hux, and M.J. Schull.
2001. Problems for clinical judgement—Introducing cognitive
psychology as one more basic science. Journal of Applied
Mathematics and Computing 164(3): 358–360.
Reitemeier, P.J. 2000. Quality and error in bioethics consultation: A
puzzle in pieces. In Margin of error: The ethics of mistakes in the
practice of medicine, ed. S.B. Rubin, and L. Zoloth, 231–253.
Hagerstown, Maryland: University Publishing Group.
Reiter-Theil, S. 2001. Ethics consultation in Germany: The present
situation. HEC-Forum 13(3): 265–280.
Reiter-Theil, S. 2003. Balancing the Perspectives. The patient’s role
in clinical ethics consultation. Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy 6: 247–254.
Reiter-Theil, S. 2009. Dealing with the normative dimension in
clinical ethics consultation. Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare
Ethics 18(4): 347–359.
Reiter-Theil, S., M. Mertz, and B. Meyer-Zehnder. 2007. The
complex Role of Relatives in end-of-life decision-making: An
ethical analysis. HEC-Forum 19(4): 341–364.
Richter, G. 2007. Greater patient, family and surrogate involvement
in clinical ethics consultation: The model of clinical ethics
liaison as a measure for preventive ethics. HEC-Forum 19(4):
327–340.
Rosenberg, L.A. 1961. Group size, prior experience and conformity.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63: 436–437.
Rosenthal, R. 1966. Experimenter effects in behavioral research. New
York: Appleton-Entury-Crofts.
Ross, J., S. Ross, and B. McClung. 2006. Ethical decision making and
organizational behavior: A case of life and death. HEC Forum
18: 193–206.
Rubin, S.B., and L. Zoloth (eds.). 2000. Margin of error: The ethics of
mistakes in the practice of medicine. Hagerstown, Maryland:
University Publishing Group.
Saks, M.J. 1977. Jury verdicts—The role of group size and social
decision rule. Lexington MA: Heath.
Saks, M.J., and M.W. Marti. 1997. A meta-analysis of the effects of
jury size. Law and Human Behavior 21(5): 451–467.
Schulz-Hardt, S., F. Brodbeck, A. Mojzisch, R. Kerschreiter, and D.
Frey. 2006. Group decision making in hidden profile situations—
Dissent as a facilitator for decision quality. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 6: 1080–1093.
Spranca, M., E. Minsk, and J. Baron. 1991. Omission and commission
in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 27(1): 76–105.
Stasser, G. 2000. Information distribution, participation and group
decision—Explorations with the DISCUSS and SPEAK models.
In Computational modelling of behaviour in organizations, ed.
D.R. Ilgen, and C.L. Hulin, 135–161. Washington, DC: Amer-
ican Psychological Association.
Stasser, G., and W. Titus. 1985. Pooling of unshared information in
group decision making—Biased information sampling during
discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48:
1467–1478.
Sugarman, J., and D.P. Sulmasy (eds.). 2001. Methods in medical
ethics. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Sunstein, C.R. 2005. Moral heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
28(4): 531–573.
Thorndike, E.L. 1920. A constant error in psychological rating.
Journal of Applied Psychology 4: 25–29.
Zikmund-Fisher, B.J., B. Sarr, A. Fagerlin, and P.A. Ubel. 2006. A
matter of perspective—Choosing for others differs from choos-
ing for yourself in making treatment decisions. Journal of
General Internal Medicine 21(6): 618–622.
162 H. Albisser Schleger et al.
123
